This book examines Cold War relations between Egypt and the United States. The author argues that Nasser’s responses to security and political threats in the Middle East and North Arica conflicted with America’s postwar strategy in those regions. The author focuses on how the failure of American–Egyptian diplomacy endangered the Postwar Petroleum Order and facilitated the outbreak of the Six-Day War.
Alexander M. Shelby is associate professor at Indian River State College.
Chapter 1: The Historical Legacy
Chapter 2: Nasserism and American Cold War Policy
Chapter 3: The Syrian Dilemma & Nasser’s Yemeni Labyrinth, 1962-1963
Chapter 4: Phantom Governments and the Portents of War
Chapter 5: Out of the Void: Lyndon Johnson & MENA
Chapter 6: Palestine, Hydropolitics, and Lbj
Chapter 7: End of the Beginning of the American-Egyptian Relations in 1964
Chapter 8: Britain’s Cold War with Nasser East of Suez
Chapter 9: Conclusion
Understanding Lyndon Johnson’s foreign policy outside of Vietnam remains a challenge for historians. Alexander M. Shelby’s new book provides critical insight and an original perspective in assessing the Johnson approach to the Middle East, and in particular to Egypt’s leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Shelby’s thorough research and analysis provides a clear picture of the administration’s failure and the resulting June 1967 war. The book is a vital contribution to the scholarship on this era in the history of United States foreign relations.
In Lyndon Johnson and the Postwar Order in the Middle East, 1962–1967, Alexander M. Shelby provides yet another example of how the Johnson presidency was much more than the Vietnam War and the Great Society. Based on multilingual archival research, Shelby shows how Johnson crafted a nuanced and sophisticated strategy vis-à-vis the Middle East that continues to resonate today.
Alexander Shelby’s well-written and thoroughly researched transnational history offers valuable new insights into the causes of the May–June 1967 crisis that led to the Six-Day War. Comparing the diplomacy of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson toward Egypt, Shelby shows that the former’s misreading of Egyptian policy and strategy helped push Cairo along the path to war. Diplomatic and military historians, as well as international relations scholars, will learn much from this book.