Adam J. Levine analyzes the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with a particular focus on Nikita Khrushchev’s motives and the response of the Kennedy administration. Levine’s account presents a different portrayal of the events than popularly told, shedding light on John F. Kennedy’s decision-making practices and personal behavior while out of public eye.
Adam J. Levine is an independent scholar.
Part I: The Background
Chapter 1: Khrushchev and the Cold War Background
Chapter 2: The Kennedy Administration and Its Policies
Chapter 3: The Cold War 1961-1962
Part II: The Crisis
Chapter 4: The Great Gamble: The Decision, Plans, Buildup
Chapter 5: To Look or Not to Look: The Runup to the Crisis, July-October 1962
Chapter 6: The First Seven Days: The Secret Crisis
Chapter 7: The Second Week: The Public Crisis
Chapter 8: Aftermath and Conclusions
The Soviets' Greatest Gambit offers a provocative and controversial reinterpretation of one of the seminal events of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Alan Levine provides an unsentimental look at President John F. Kennedy’s diplomatic and military response to Moscow’s provocation, depicting it as far more inept and bungling than most traditional accounts. At the heart of this study is a novel and chilling interpretation of the Kremlin’s sinister reasons for the missile deployment in Cuba.