Hili Razinsky is a researcher at LanCog, The Center of Philosophy, University of Lisbon
The author has produced a bold and fiercely independent account of ambivalence; an account which is rich, nuanced and detailed. Razinsky adopts a framework which, broadly speaking, is both Wittgensteinian and phenomenological. She turns to such diverse authors as Sartre, Freud, Bernard Williams and Philip Koch and with a little help from these friends devises her own notion of ambivalence.
We find ambivalence so unsettling, I think, because its presence starkly reminds that we can’t always get what we want. But this goes too far, and Razinsky’s Ambivalence helps us to see why. Ambivalence does not disclose just how incoherent and fractured we are as agents. Rather, as Razinsky shows, it illuminates a space in which there is room for autonomous self-expression. Compromised actions are not compromises of agency. They, instead, reveal a deep spring of human creativity: the people we make ourselves into emerge from our limitations.
Razinsky’s aim in Ambivalence is avowedly philosophical, and she hews closely to her course, though she embraces the psychological perspective that ambivalences arise organically through ordinary mental processes and depend on a whole psychical microcosm. Therefore, and given her convergence with the deepest psychological thinking on her subject, she might, with some loosening of the analytic straitjacket, find herself well positioned to advance both causes.