Slezak’s goal is to explain what qualia are and how they are possible within a materialist framework, that is without resorting to either substance or property dualism. Slezak argues that thinking that the explanation of qualia requires some kind of dualism is the result of a seductive error that can be found in other areas of philosophy, such as a theory of meaning and epistemology, which generates problems in those areas inviting unconvincing solutions. This error is grounded on what Slezak refers to as "the theater error," which comes from Danial Dennett and which supposes that the mind is a screen and there is a little person inside each person watching the show on the screen. But Slezak adds that the exact nature and upshot of the error has been misunderstood. Making such an error is itself just what should be expected if materialism is true. This is a significant study of the mind-body problem, but it also covers ground in the history of philosophy and philosophy of language. It will be useful primarily to scholars working on the mind-body problem and secondarily to those working in other areas. Recommended. Graduate students, researchers, faculty.
— Choice Reviews
With clear and persuasive arguments, Spectator in the Cartesian Theater provides a useful and compelling perspective on longstanding debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and epistemology. Slezak ties together, under one convenient rubric, a number of philosophical errors now prevalent in these fields, boldly challenging widely held assumptions, and reinterpreting the significance of classic intuition pumps from Searle, Putnam, Gettier, Newcomb, and others. This book is sure to spark controversy and push the conversation in new directions.
— David Pereplyotchik, Kent State University
In this highly original book Peter Slezak puts his finger on the problem with representationalist theories of mind – they interpose the theorist, that is, ourselves, between mind and world to adjudicate the reference of mental states. He identifies versions of this spectator error in standard treatments of proper names, the Gettier problem, perceptual experience, and other central issues in contemporary philosophy. Spectator in the Cartesian Theater is breathtaking in its scope, yet firmly anchored in the primary literature and carefully argued throughout. Essential reading for anyone working in the philosophies of mind and language.
— Frances Egan, Rutgers University