Anatomy of Victory

Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq

John D. Caldwell

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies.

Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans.

A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Pages: 568 • Trim: 6⅜ x 9⅜

978-1-5381-1477-3 • Hardback • November 2018 • $29.95 • (£25.00)

978-1-5381-1478-0 • eBook • November 2018 • $28.50 • (£19.99)

Subjects: History / Military / General, History / Military / Vietnam War, History / Military / Korean War, History / Military / World War II, History / Military / United States, History / Military / Iraq War (2003-2011), History / Military / Strategy

Anatomy of Victory

Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq

Hardback

eBook

Summary

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies.

Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans.

A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

Details

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Pages: 568 • Trim: 6⅜ x 9⅜

978-1-5381-1477-3 • Hardback • November 2018 • $29.95 • (£25.00)

978-1-5381-1478-0 • eBook • November 2018 • $28.50 • (£19.99)

Subjects: History / Military / General, History / Military / Vietnam War, History / Military / Korean War, History / Military / World War II, History / Military / United States, History / Military / Iraq War (2003-2011), History / Military / Strategy

Author

John D. Caldwell (1940–2019) retired in 2007 after a fifty-year career in defense think tanks and aerospace companies. Trained as a political scientist with a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, he was first posted to Saigon in 1968 as part of a classified research project for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency. Caldwell joined TRW Space & Defense in 1982 to work on major defense, NASA, and intelligence community programs. He continued as a consultant at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, which acquired TRW in 2002.

Table of Contents

Maps, Figures, and Table
Preface
Acknowledgments
PART I: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: INTRODUCTION
PART II: WORLD WAR II
1 Battle of Britain: Winning by Not Losing
2 Battle of the Atlantic: Protecting the Maritime Lifeline
3 Invasion of Russia: Hitler’s Strategic Mistake
4 Battle of El Alamein and Operation Torch: Cracking German Invincibility
5 Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: Regaining Initiative in the Pacific
6 Strategic Bombing Offensive: Breaking German Airpower
7 Invasion of Italy: Deciding to Fight Somewhere in Europe in 1943
8 D-Day and the Battle for Normandy: Retaking the Continent
9 Battle for the Rhine: Attacking Germany’s Vitals
10 Battle of Okinawa and the Bombing of Japan: Ending the War
11 The Strategic Architectures of World War II
PART III: THE KOREAN WAR
12 Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: Getting the Most Out of a Bad Situation
13 Inchon—Operation Chromite: MacArthur’s Masterstroke
14 Crossing the 38th Parallel and Driving North to the Yalu: The Risks of Overreaching
15 Operations Ripper and Killer: Recovery and Frustration
16 The Strategic Architectures of the Korean War
PART IV: THE VIETNAM WAR
17 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley: Not Fighting the Decisive Battle
18 Bombing Campaign and High-Tech Initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White Airpower and Technology Indecisive
19 The Pacification Program (1967–1968): Failing to Change Behavior
20 The Tet Offensive (1968): Strategic Disaster
21 Vietnamization: Never a Winning Strategy
22 The Final Years (1969–1975): The Losing Path
23 The Strategic Architectures of the Vietnam War
PART V: THE IRAQI WARS
24 Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: Defeating Saddam, Losing Politically
25 Iraqi War II, Thirteen-Year Air Conflict: The Limits of Airpower
26 Iraqi War III, Invasion of Iraq: Winning without an Endgame
27 Iraqi War IV, the Insurgency and the Surge (2007–2008): Relearning Counterinsurgency
28 Iraqi War V, the Rise of ISIS: A New, More Violent Enemy
29 The Strategic Architectures of the Iraqi Wars
PART VI: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: THE ENDGAME
Acronyms and Selected Glossary
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index

Reviews

Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America’s major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. . . . [For] those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating.
— Publishers Weekly

Caldwell’s book is a reflection of a lifetime spent studying and analyzing U.S wars at several defense think tanks for more than 50 years. . . . As he walks readers though history, Caldwell provides both civilian and military strategists at all levels—including the Presidents—with the necessary information to understand how strategies evolved or disintegrated, succeeded brilliantly or fell short, or simply muddled along, wasting lives and national treasure in the process. . . . For civilian policymakers and military officers alike, Anatomy of Victory will yield lessons not only for strategy, but also for fostering and maintaining healthy relations. . . . Having lived athwart the wars and leaders he profiles, Caldwell has given readers a readable and important work that will help civilian and military leaders refine their abilities to develop and understand grand strategy. As we enter an era of renewed great power competition, these abilities have become vital.
— Proceedings Magazine, the flagship publication of the U.S. Naval Institute

Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations.
— H. R. McMaster

Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals—and far fewer of our elected leaders—have Caldwell’s talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity.
— Mark Helprin

As interesting a book as it gets. . . . The central problem the author addresses is the unsatisfying outcome to the conflicts after 1945. This is something few of us who witnessed the World War think about. Why has the good Uncle become such a patsy? . . . Caldwell offers a set of guidelines about how to think about involvement in any continuing or future conflict. They make a lot of sense. First and foremost is to align an overseas mission goal with America’s core interests and how to achieve that goal. If alignment fails, however, the mission risks failure beyond America’s control.
— Takimag

Anatomy of Victory puts four wars side-by-side in a scientific analysis of what went right and what went wrong to produce the differing outcomes in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. . . . Why the wars after 1945 turned out badly is easy to understand—it's in a paragraph on page 431. . . . Caldwell succinctly tells us what went wrong and what you must do if you don't want a failed war. . . . His cogent conclusions define the criteria by which staff leaders must evaluate staff proposals, by which the president must evaluate cabinet proposals, by which Congress must evaluate the work of the executive, and by which the public must judge the performance of its political leaders. . . . None of this has been done for more than half a century. That's the point and that's the profound importance of Anatomy of Victory.
— Jeffrey Race, author of War Comes to Long An

Caldwell compares planning and operations in World War II to later limited wars that have nonetheless had enormous national consequences: Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. His detailed, well-documented account indicates that the U.S. forces repeatedly suffer from ill-conceived strategies and increasing lack of realism. His . . . critique of limited war is knowledgeable and compelling.
— The American Conservative

Anatomy of Victory is exceptionally well written. It includes exceptional maps and other graphics that provide a conceptual framework in analyzing past conflict. Its detailed accounts of key events and decisive battles provide a clearer understanding of decisions made by policy makers and military leaders at the strategic and operational levels of war. It is a must read for policy makers and military planners in considering the strategic architecture in planning for future conflict.
— Military Review

Features

3/11/2019: Book recommended in The American Conservative's "Bookshelf of the Week"

Link: https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/tac-bookshelf-for-the-week-of-march-11/