Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of the Fed

Jack Rasmus

The US in 1913 was one of the last major economies to establish an institution of a central bank. The book examines, however, the history and evolution of central banking in the US from the perspective of central banking functions—i.e. aggregator of private lending to the federal government, fiscal agent for the government, regulator of money supply, monopoly over currency issuance, banking system supervision, and lender of last resort. The evolution of central banking functions is traced from earliest pre-1987 proposals, through the Constitutional Convention and Congressional debates on Hamilton’s 1st Report on Credit, the rise and fall of the 1st and 2nd Banks of the United States, through the long period of the National Banking System, 1862-1913.

The book describes how US federal governments—often in cooperation with the largest US private banks in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere in the northeast—attempted to expand and develop those functions, sometimes successfully sometimes not, from 1781 through the creation of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Other themes include how rapid US economic growth, and an expanding, geographically dispersed private banking system, created formidable resistance by banks at the state and local level to the evolution and consolidation of central banking functions at the national level. Whenever central banking functions were dismantled (1810s, 1830s) or were weakened (after 1860s), the consequences were financial instability and severe economic depressions.

The book concludes with a detailed narrative on how, from 1903 to 1913, big eastern banks—leveraging the Panic of 1907, weak economic recovery of 1909-13, and need to expand internationally—allied with Congressional supporters to prevail over state and local banking interests and created the Fed; how the structure of the 1913 Fed clearly favored New York banks while granting concessions to state and local banks to win Congressional approval; and how that compromise central bank structure doomed US monetary policy to fail after 1929.

Lexington Books

Pages: 146 • Trim: 6¼ x 9¼

978-1-4985-8284-1 • Hardback • February 2019 • $111.00 • (£85.00)

978-1-4985-8286-5 • Paperback • October 2020 • $47.99 • (£37.00)

978-1-4985-8285-8 • eBook • February 2019 • $45.50 • (£35.00)

Subjects: Business & Economics / Economic History, Political Science / History & Theory

Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of the Fed

Hardback

Paperback

eBook

Summary

The US in 1913 was one of the last major economies to establish an institution of a central bank. The book examines, however, the history and evolution of central banking in the US from the perspective of central banking functions—i.e. aggregator of private lending to the federal government, fiscal agent for the government, regulator of money supply, monopoly over currency issuance, banking system supervision, and lender of last resort. The evolution of central banking functions is traced from earliest pre-1987 proposals, through the Constitutional Convention and Congressional debates on Hamilton’s 1st Report on Credit, the rise and fall of the 1st and 2nd Banks of the United States, through the long period of the National Banking System, 1862-1913.

The book describes how US federal governments—often in cooperation with the largest US private banks in New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere in the northeast—attempted to expand and develop those functions, sometimes successfully sometimes not, from 1781 through the creation of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Other themes include how rapid US economic growth, and an expanding, geographically dispersed private banking system, created formidable resistance by banks at the state and local level to the evolution and consolidation of central banking functions at the national level. Whenever central banking functions were dismantled (1810s, 1830s) or were weakened (after 1860s), the consequences were financial instability and severe economic depressions.

The book concludes with a detailed narrative on how, from 1903 to 1913, big eastern banks—leveraging the Panic of 1907, weak economic recovery of 1909-13, and need to expand internationally—allied with Congressional supporters to prevail over state and local banking interests and created the Fed; how the structure of the 1913 Fed clearly favored New York banks while granting concessions to state and local banks to win Congressional approval; and how that compromise central bank structure doomed US monetary policy to fail after 1929.

Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 146 • Trim: 6¼ x 9¼

978-1-4985-8284-1 • Hardback • February 2019 • $111.00 • (£85.00)

978-1-4985-8286-5 • Paperback • October 2020 • $47.99 • (£37.00)

978-1-4985-8285-8 • eBook • February 2019 • $45.50 • (£35.00)

Subjects: Business & Economics / Economic History, Political Science / History & Theory

Author

Jack Rasmus is professor of economics at St. Mary's College.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: The Evolution of Central Banking Functions in the US

Chapter Two: Hamilton’s Vision

Chapter Three: The 1st Bank of the US as Central Bank

Chapter Four: The 2nd Bank of the US as Central Bank

Chapter Five: Jackson Contra Central Banking

Chapter Six: From Free Banking to National Banking

Chapter Seven: The Legacies of National Banking: 1873-1898

Chapter Eight: Panic of 1907 & the Treasury’s Last Hurrah

Chapter Nine: The Road to the Fed, 1903-1913

Chapter Ten: The Fed as Bank of Bankers, 1913-1929

Reviews

When the Federal Reserve came into existence in 1913, the name of the institution deliberately did not include the words central bank. As Rasmus points out, since the time of Hamilton, there had been a tension between the need for a central bank and the centralization of economic and political power that such an entity would represent. Better then to set up a system of regional banks vested with the power to issue a single currency, regulate interest rates, and serve as the lender of last resort. The Fed’s structure departed from Hamilton’s notion of a hybrid bank that merged private and public interests. Early experiments, such as the First Bank of the United States, foundered in large part because of the subjugation of the public interest by private banks beholden to their shareholders. Rasmus deftly limns Hamilton’s vision for a central bank, and the description of the myriad financial crises and banking panics dotting the 19th and early 20th centuries highlights the need for a monetary authority independent of both political pressure and private interests. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty.
— Choice Reviews

Over the past 12 years, Dr. Jack Rasmus is a prolific writer on the state of the global and U.S. economy, and critic of current and former fiscal and monetary policy. Dr. Rasmus extends his research, allowing us to see the current Federal Reserve from a historical-political-policy and economic context, and how the bank evolved over the years; however, it seems the bank continues to make the same mistakes as earlier banks: excessive money supply, lack of supervision, speculative lending, asset price bubbles, bank bailouts, and lower standards of living-social welfare. Seems there needs to be central bank reform.
— Lawrence A. Souza, St. Mary's College

Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of the Fed

Jack Rasmus

Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of the Fed

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