Lexington Books
Pages: 474
Trim: 7⅜ x 10
978-1-4985-4908-0 • Hardback • April 2018 • $160.00 • (£123.00)
978-1-4985-4910-3 • Paperback • July 2020 • $51.99 • (£40.00)
978-1-4985-4909-7 • eBook • July 2020 • $49.00 • (£38.00)
John Cirace is professor of economics and business law at Lehman College, CUNY, and adjunct professor of law at Brooklyn Law School.
Acknowledgments
Illustrations
IntroductionPart I: When are Thinking like an Economist and Thinking like a Lawyer Consistent?Chapter 1: Pareto Efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks Criterion Compared
Chapter 2: Rational Economic Behavior and Logic Defined
Chapter 3: Judicial Use of Economic Rationality (Efficiency)
Chapter 4: Equal Protection and Lexical Constraints on Efficiency
Chapter 5: Legal Rationality and Logic Defined
Chapter 6: When are Law and Economics Consistent (Isomorphic)?
Part II: Providing Infrastructure and Controlling Externalities Requires Resolving Conflicts between Individual Self-Interest and CooperationChapter 7: Prisoners’ Dilemma and Introduction to Game Theory
Chapter 8: Market and Government Failures as Prisoners’ Dilemmas
Chapter 9: Five Requirements for Competitive Markets
Chapter 10: In the Long Run We Are All Dead
Part III: General Case vs. Hard Case Methodologies: Rottenberg, Coase, Calabresi, and PosnerChapter 11: Rottenberg’s Theorem: Effect of a Change in Property Rights on Free Markets
Chapter 12: Coase’s Theorems: Effect of Property Rights and Liability Rules on Mutually Interfering Activities
Chapter 13: Calabresi’s Criteria for Allocating Accident Costs Common to Several Activities
Chapter 14: Posner’s Economic Analysis of the Common Law
Part IV: Risk, Insurance, and Incomplete Information Chapter 15: Risk, Insurance, Judge Hand Test, and Value of a Statistical Life
Chapter 16: Incomplete Information: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Principal-Agent Problem
Part V: Law and Economics of Civil Obligation
Chapter 17: Game Theoretic Framework for Law and Economics of Civil Obligation
Chapter 18: Torts: Negligence and Products Liability
Chapter 19: Strict Rules, Competitive Market Contract Model
Chapter 20: Discretionary Standards, Imperfect Competition Contract Model
Chapter 21: Decision Theory, Suit, and Settlement
Bibliography
About the Author
Law and Economics is an important field by now. Law students, judges, lawyers, legal commentators cannot understand the law without being familiar with Law and Economics. This books provides for a very useful introduction to the subject with two important twists. First, it uses the rigor and sophistication of Game Theory to survey the main areas of the common law from the perspective of Law and Economics. Second, it illustrates the technical aspects with actual caselaw, thus helping the reader to relate Game Theory and legal decisions. Professor Cirace makes Law, Economics and Game Theory a friendly reading to everyone with an interest in legal policymaking.
— Nuno Garoupa, Texas A&M University