The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia's Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954

In NATO's Backyard

Ivan Laković and Dmitar Tasić

Yugoslav military cooperation with West emerged after the country’s split with the U.S.S.R. and its allies in 1948. It came as a surprise for many, since Yugoslavia used to be one of the staunchest followers of Soviet politics. However, faced with possible military escalation of the ideological, political, and economic worsening of relations with the East, the Yugoslav leadership quickly turned to their former “class enemies.” For the United States, it presented an opportunity to acquire many unexpected political benefits. Yugoslav alienation from the Kremlin provided territorial consolidation of the southern flank of NATO, denial of direct approach to the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy to Soviet troops, and dealt a strong political blow to the homogeneity of the Eastern bloc. While not insisting on changing the ideological nature of Yugoslav state, the United States provided much needed material and financial aid, developing the base for entering into sphere of military cooperation. It had two main categories—direct support for Yugoslav forces through shipments of military equipment, as well as Yugoslavia entering into defensive, military alliance (the Balkan Pact) with Greece and Turkey, already full members of NATO. Such trends, aiming towards closer Yugoslav bonding with Western military and political structures, ended in the mid-1950s with Stalin’s death, the outbreak of the Trieste crisis, and Tito’s reconciliation with Soviet leadership. Developing the new policy of non-alignment with either of the confronting blocs, Yugoslavia stepped out from the program of Western military aid, while the Balkan Pact slowly faded in growing animosity between Greece and Turkey.

Lexington Books

Pages: 300 • Trim: 6¼ x 9¼

978-1-4985-3933-3 • Hardback • July 2016 • $123.00 • (£95.00)

978-1-4985-3934-0 • eBook • July 2016 • $116.50 • (£90.00)

Series: The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series

Subjects: History / Europe / Eastern, History / Cold War, History / Military / General, History / Military / Strategy

The Tito–Stalin Split and Yugoslavia's Military Opening toward the West, 1950–1954

In NATO's Backyard

Hardback

eBook

Summary

Yugoslav military cooperation with West emerged after the country’s split with the U.S.S.R. and its allies in 1948. It came as a surprise for many, since Yugoslavia used to be one of the staunchest followers of Soviet politics. However, faced with possible military escalation of the ideological, political, and economic worsening of relations with the East, the Yugoslav leadership quickly turned to their former “class enemies.” For the United States, it presented an opportunity to acquire many unexpected political benefits. Yugoslav alienation from the Kremlin provided territorial consolidation of the southern flank of NATO, denial of direct approach to the Adriatic Sea and Northern Italy to Soviet troops, and dealt a strong political blow to the homogeneity of the Eastern bloc. While not insisting on changing the ideological nature of Yugoslav state, the United States provided much needed material and financial aid, developing the base for entering into sphere of military cooperation. It had two main categories—direct support for Yugoslav forces through shipments of military equipment, as well as Yugoslavia entering into defensive, military alliance (the Balkan Pact) with Greece and Turkey, already full members of NATO. Such trends, aiming towards closer Yugoslav bonding with Western military and political structures, ended in the mid-1950s with Stalin’s death, the outbreak of the Trieste crisis, and Tito’s reconciliation with Soviet leadership. Developing the new policy of non-alignment with either of the confronting blocs, Yugoslavia stepped out from the program of Western military aid, while the Balkan Pact slowly faded in growing animosity between Greece and Turkey.

Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 300 • Trim: 6¼ x 9¼

978-1-4985-3933-3 • Hardback • July 2016 • $123.00 • (£95.00)

978-1-4985-3934-0 • eBook • July 2016 • $116.50 • (£90.00)

Series: The Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series

Subjects: History / Europe / Eastern, History / Cold War, History / Military / General, History / Military / Strategy

Author

Ivan Laković is research associate at the Historical Institute of the University of Montenegro.

Dmitar Tasić is postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for War Studies of University College Dublin.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Breaking the Ice: Unofficial Diplomacy
Chapter 2: Toward Signing an Agreement
Chapter 3: Hard Talks: From Military Aid to Military Coordination
Chapter 4: The Balkan Treaty: Toward the New Balkan Alliance
Chapter 5: The Key Year of 1955: Between the Generals and the Politicians
Chapter 6: Yugoslav Military Rapprochement to the West: Pretext and Context
Chapter 7: Under a Different Light: Reconsiderations and Stagnation of the Military Assistance Program
Conclusion
Annex: Conferences of Military Experts

Reviews

In this indispensable book, Laković and Tasić display a nuanced understanding of the interplay of ideological, political, and military aspects in the early postwar period in their examination of the unlikely cooperation between communist Yugoslavia and the West.
— Vladimir Petrovic, Central European University

Meant to bring Yugoslavs, Turks, and Greeks together, Laković and Tasić unveil the untold story of the Balkan Pact, an unusually strange, yet forgotten, alignment of the early Cold War years. Providing in-depth analysis of the events leading to its formation, this book is the first comprehensive effort to bring the Balkan Pact to the attention of Western readers. This book highlights how the exigencies and concerns of the prospect of a Soviet-satellite attack similar to what happened in Korea loomed large in Belgrade and oriented the Yugoslav leadership toward Washington. It sheds light on how Cold War dynamics set off by the death of Stalin took the wind off from the sails of the budding Pact and brought its ephemeral voyage to a halt. Laković and Tasić also draw readers’ attention to local problems such as Cyprus issue, which played the role of catalyst for weakening the cohesion of the Pact and gave opportunities to Joseph Broz Tito to portray himself as one of the pivotal statesmen of the emerging Movement of Nonaligned Countries. A definitively fresh look of the repetitive narratives of the Cold War.
— Gencer Özcan, Istanbul Bilgi University

This book represents an important contribution to understanding the complex political dynamics of the Balkan region in the early period of the Cold War. Based largely on documents from Belgrade archives, this is the first comprehensive English-language study analyzing Yugoslavia’s careful rapprochement with the West in the years following the Tito–Stalin break. The authors provide deep insight into the strategic thinking of Yugoslav leaders and the difficult choices they faced in light of a potential Soviet military invasion, and they explain how Belgrade eventually managed to pursue a rather successful policy of balancing between the blocs after Stalin’s death and the easing of tensions in East–West relations.
— Jeronim Perović, University of Zurich

From Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform to the Tito–Khrushchev reconciliation, the major topics of this highly recommended study include the initial approach to the West for military support that culminated in the 1951 agreement, the agreement's gradual decay through 1957, and the rise and decline of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey. Based on Yugoslav sources and declassified documents, this work is an outstanding and original account of Yugoslavia's search for security.
— Zachary T. Irwin, Penn State Behrend

An excellent and insightful study backed up with in-depth research.
— André Gerolymatos, Simon Fraser University