Trim: 6 x 9
978-0-7391-8556-8 • Hardback • December 2013 • $184.00 • (£142.00)
978-1-4985-2486-5 • Paperback • August 2016 • $78.99 • (£61.00)
978-0-7391-8557-5 • eBook • December 2013 • $71.00 • (£55.00)
Günter Bischof is a university research professor and director of CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans, Louisiana.Stefan Karner is head of the Department of Economic, Social, and Business History at the University of Graz and director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research of War Consequences, Graz-Vienna.Barbara Stelzl-Marx is deputy director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research of War Consequences and lecturer at the University of Graz.
Part I: Introduction and Historical Context
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History, Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marx
Chapter 2: Summitry in the Twentieth Century: An Overview, David Reynolds
Part II: Contextualizing the Vienna Summit
United States, France, and Great Britain
Chapter 3: “The First Test of [. . .] Détente Will Be the Berlin Negotiation”: Berlin, Disarmament, and the 1960 Paris Summit, Richard D. Williamson
Chapter 4: “Vienna, a City that is Symbolic of the Possibility of Finding Equitable Solutions”: John F. Kennedy and His European Summitry in Early June 1961, Günter Bischof and Martin Kofler
Chapter 5: Great Britain and the Vienna Summit of June 1961, Anne Deighton
Chapter 6: Paris as Beneficiary of the Unsuccessful Vienna Summit, Georges-Henri Soutou
Chapter 7: Soviet–American Relations in the Early 1960s, Vladimir Pechatnov
Chapter 8: Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The U.S. –Soviet Negotiating Process in the Khrushchev Era, Ol’ga Pavlenko
Asia and Africa
Chapter 9: Casting a Long Shadow over Vienna: The Chinese Factor in the Vienna Summit, Michail Prozumenshchikov
Chapter 10: Laos and the Vienna Summit, Lawrence Freedman
Part III: The Summit
Chapter 11: Two Days of Drama: Preparation and Execution of the Vienna Summit, Barbara Stelzl-Marx
Chapter 12: A Difficult Education: John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna, Timothy Naftali
Chapter 13: “Summit Ladies”: Gender Arrangements, Media Staging, and Symbolic Scenes of the 1961Vienna Summit Talks, Ingrid Bauer
Chapter 14: Moral Masculinity: Gender, Power, and the Kennedy–Khrushchev Relationship, Jennifer Lynn Walton
Chapter 15: On the Significance of Austrian Neutrality for Soviet Foreign Policy under Nikita S. Khrushchev, Peter Ruggenthaler
Chapter 16: The Personal Recollections of a Presidential Adviser in Vienna, Ted Sorensen
Chapter 17: The Personal Recollections of Khrushchev’s Interpreter in Vienna, Viktor Sukhodrev
Part IV: The Berlin Crisis
Chapter 18: Khrushchev, the Berlin Wall, and the Demand for a Peace Treaty, 1961–1963, Gerhard Wettig
Chapter 19: The Vienna Summit and the Construction of the Berlin Wall, Manfred Wilke
Appendix 1: Soviet Kennedy Profile
Appendix 2: CIA Profile of Krushchev in Kennedy’s Briefing Papers
Appendix 4:Krushchev’s Presidium Statement before the Vienna Trip
Appendix 3-1:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 3 June 1961, 12:45 p.m.
Appendix 3-2:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 3 June 1961, 3 p.m.
Appendix 3-3:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 4 June 1961, 10:15 a.m.
Based on Russian and US archives and the multinational research efforts of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for the Study of the Consequences of War in Graz, Austria, in conjunction with the Contemporary History Archives (RGANI) in Moscow and the Institute of Contemporary History in Munich-Berlin, this book represents a definitive study of the bilateral Vienna Summit meeting of Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy. The authors of the various articles are top scholars and, in the case of Ted Sorensen and Viktor Sukhodrev, participants in the summit. This valuable contribution to the history of the Vienna Summit's place in international history and in the history of the Cold War offers fresh assessments of Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Kremlin's decision-making process. It shows, too, that the US had accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. The book is rich in documents and should be in every research library. Includes a useful introduction, index, and bibliography. Summing Up: Essential. All academic levels/libraries.
— Choice Reviews
John Kennedy’s meeting with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in early June 1961 spawned a running controversy among political observers and scholars. Did Kennedy encourage Khrushchev’s attempts to take control of West Berlin by appearing weak? Or, did Khrushchev misread Kennedy’s resolve and overplay his hand, leading to the construction of the Berlin Wall (which Khrushchev earlier did not want) and his subsequent humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis? This volume provides both key documents and informed commentary that should resolve these controversies. It turns out that the truth is more complicated than the simplistic interpretations that were long current. This collection will be an essential reference for scholars of international relations, of European history, and of the diplomacy of the Cold War.
— Jack F. Matlock, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, 1987–1991, Author of Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended
• Winner, CHOICE Outstanding Academic Titles (2014)