Lexington Books
Pages: 230
Trim: 6½ x 9⅜
978-1-4985-1964-9 • Hardback • May 2016 • $109.00 • (£84.00)
978-1-4985-1965-6 • eBook • May 2016 • $103.50 • (£80.00)
David K. Chan is professor of philosophy at University of Wisconsin—Stevens Point.
Preface
Introduction
The Need to Reconceptualize Action
What Needs to be Reconceptualized
Putting the Pieces Together
Chapter 1: Towards a Theory of Action
Philosophy of Action
Causal and Non-Causal Theories
Conceptualizing Action
‘Actopia’
Evaluating Action
Fixing the Constants
An Outline of this Book
Chapter 2: Intention
Skepticism about Intention
The Planning Theory of Intention
Intention and Reasons for Acting
Comparing Concepts of Intention
Chapter 3: Desire
Defining Desire
Extrinsic Desire
Desire Ownership
Motivation, Reason, and Akratic Agency
Chapter 4: From Volitions to Tryings
Volitions and the Regress Problem
Why Do Volitionalists Say Strange Things?
A Theory of Tryings
The Identity-Theory of Trying as Mental and Physical
Mental Tryings
The Theoretical Advantage of Conceptualizing Tryings as Processes
Non-Observational Knowledge of Trying
Chapter 5: Problems and Issues in Action Theory
Deviant Causality
The Simple View
Non-Intentional Actions
Basic and Non-Basic Actions
The Nature of Action
Desiring and Intending to Try
Chapter 6: Rational and Moral Agency
The Doctrine of Double Effect
The Moral Significance of Non-Intentional Agency
The Argument Against Ethical Rationalism
Conclusion
The Reconceptualized Action Theory
The Importance of Getting It Right
Bibliography
Index
Chan's discussions and arguments are often insightful and engaging.... [I]t is very clearly written and its arguments are thought-provoking and instructive. This is enough to make Chan's book a valuable contribution to contemporary philosophy of action.
— Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
An instructive examination of basic concepts in the philosophy of action, including action, intention, decision, and trying. Chan usefully brings the philosophy of action into contact with ethical theory and the moral assessment of agents and their actions.
— Alfred R. Mele, Florida State University