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Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness

Samuel Kahn

Throughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one’s own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional arguments—an interpersonal one and an intrapersonal one—for the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one’s own happiness.

Lexington Books

Pages: 280 • Trim: 6½ x 9

978-1-4985-1961-8 • Hardback • December 2018 • $111.00 • (£85.00)

978-1-4985-1962-5 • eBook • December 2018 • $105.00 • (£81.00)

Subjects: Philosophy / Individual Philosophers, Philosophy / General, Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Philosophy / Logic

Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness

Hardback

eBook

Summary

Throughout his corpus, Kant repeatedly and resolutely denies that there is a duty to promote one’s own happiness, and most present-day Kantians seem to agree with him. In Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness, Samuel Kahn argues that this denial rests on two main ideas: (1) a conception of duty that makes the principle of ought implies can (OIC) and the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) analytic, and (2) the claim that humans necessarily promote their own happiness. This book defends OIC and PAP but nonetheless attacks the second idea, and it supplements this attack with two additional arguments—an interpersonal one and an intrapersonal one—for the claim that a modern day Kantian ethics should affirm a duty to promote one’s own happiness.

Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 280 • Trim: 6½ x 9

978-1-4985-1961-8 • Hardback • December 2018 • $111.00 • (£85.00)

978-1-4985-1962-5 • eBook • December 2018 • $105.00 • (£81.00)

Subjects: Philosophy / Individual Philosophers, Philosophy / General, Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Philosophy / Logic

Author

Samuel Kahn is associate professor of philosophy at Wuhan University.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part One. Ought implies can in Kantian ethics

Chapter 1. Terminology and Exegesis

Section 1. Terminology

Section 2. Exegesis

Chapter 2. Arguments in Favor of OIC

Section 1. Kant’s argument for OIC

Section 2. The argument from explanation

Section 3. The fairness argument

Section 4. The prescriptivist argument

Section 5. The argument from deontic logic

Chapter 3. Objections to OIC

Section 1. The appeal to alternate traditions

Section 2. The epistemic argument

Section 3. The ordinary language objection

Section 4. The appeal to culpable inability

Section 5. The argument from past obligations

Section 6. The argument from simplicity

Section 7. The argument from excuses

Section 8. The appeal to Hume’s principle

Section 9. The argument from reasons

Section 10. The moral satisfaction objection

Section 11. The appeal to obligations from nowhere

Section 12. The argument from interdependence

Section 13. The argument from epistemic oughts

Section 14. The argument from feeling oughts

Section 15. The appeal to conflicts of duties

Section 16. The argument from emphasis

Section 17. The appeal to conversational implicature

Section 18. The exphi objection

Part Two. The principle of alternate possibilities

Chapter 4. Setting the stage

Section 1. Frankfurt’s seminal attack

Section 2. Conceding PAP but mitigating the consequences

Chapter 5. The connection between PAP and OIC

Section 1. OIC entails PAP with respect to blame

Section 2. Blame requires impermissibility

Section 3. Able not to and able to do otherwise

Section 4. Some concluding remarks

Chapter 6. The second line of defense

Section 1. The metaphysical premise

Subsection 1. Flickers and alchemy

Subsection 2. The dilemma defense

Subsection 3. The deterministic horn

Subsection 4. The new dispositionalists

Subsection 5. Morally relevant alternatives

Section 2. The moral premise

Subsection 1. PAP and OIC

Subsection 2. The W-defense

Subsection 3. Counterfactual interveners and knowledge

Subsection 4. The reliability of intuitions

Part Three. The duty to promote one’s own happiness in Kantian ethics

Chapter 7. “Happiness,” “general duties” and the standard account

Section 1. “Happiness”

Section 2. “General duties”

Section 3. The standard account

Chapter 8. The means to happiness, indirect duties and two arguments for a direct duty

Section 1. Indirect duties

Section 2. Two arguments for a direct duty

Chapter 9. Objections

Section 1. Internal incoherence

Section 2. The universal desire for happiness

Section 3. Happiness as a necessary end

Section 4. A duty to promote one’s own happiness would be otiose

Section 5. Happiness is impossible

Notes

Bibliography

Reviews

Samuel Kahn’s book is a wide-ranging and provocative discussion of important issues in normative ethics, metaethics and moral psychology. It contains thoughtful and cogent discussions not only of Kant and the Kant literature, but also of contemporary treatments of the moral ought, responsibility and the place of happiness among human ends. Kahn provides an engaging introduction to all these themes.
— Allen Wood, Indiana University Bloomington

Samuel Kahn explores one of the most puzzling but under-theorized aspects of Kant’s ethics: the nature and moral importance of human happiness. Against most readings, Kahn contends that not only was Kant wrong to insist that a person could have no moral duty to promote her own happiness, but also that his own views entail that we do. Kahn brings Kant’s ethics into a sustained and illuminating conversation with the extensive contemporary literature on the relationship between obligation, blameworthiness, and the possibility of fulfilling (or failing to fulfill) the demands of morality. This encyclopedic work will be a valuable resource not just for those interested in Kant’s practical philosophy, but for anyone concerned with the moral significance of our physical and psychological limitations.
— David Sussman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness

Samuel Kahn

Kant, Ought Implies Can, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, and Happiness

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