Lexington Books
Pages: 204
•
Trim: 6¼ x 9⅜
978-0-7391-8007-5 • Hardback • January 2015 • $114.00 • (£88.00)
978-1-4985-0965-7 • Paperback • August 2016 • $52.99 • (£41.00)
978-0-7391-8008-2 • eBook • January 2015 • $50.00 • (£38.00)
Kacey Warren is lecturer of philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder.
Chapter 1 What Does Justice Require For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities?
Chapter 2 Political Equality For Citizens With Cognitive Disabilities
Chapter 3 Political Liberty and the Liberal Standard of Justification
Chapter 4 Justice as Fairness and Equal Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities
Chapter 5 Capabilities and Equal Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities
Chapter 6 Care and Equal Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities
Chapter 7 Differentiated Recognition and Equal Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities
Chapter 8 Trust, Transparency and Transformation in Political Justification
This book, Warren’s first, is an excellent addition to the growing body of work on philosophical concerns as they relate to persons with cognitive disabilities. The book comprises three parts: 'Liberalism and Cognitive Disability,' 'Four Approaches to Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities,' and 'Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities.' In the first part, Warren discusses standards and criteria for any liberal theory of justice—e.g., workable conceptions of social-political equality, including equal rights and consideration. She also enunciates various conceptions of disability, disentangling notions of disability and impairment, along with medical and social models of each. In part 2, she examines contemporary, influential approaches to these broad concerns—work by John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, Eva Feder Kittay, and Axel Honneth. Warren provides respectful assessments of their work, acknowledging what is valuable in each while offering an even-handed critique. In the final part, she offers a brief, suggestive statement identifying paths and criteria for promoting greater meaningful practice for citizens with cognitive disabilities. Warren’s book is thoughtful, careful, thorough, and fair. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty and professionals.
— Choice Reviews
Kacey Brooke Warren’s Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities is a concise, accessible introduction to various liberal political theories and the extent to which they are inclusive of citizens with cognitive disabilities. . . .Warren’s book is an important and unique contribution to political philosophy and disability studies. Readers will find in Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities a most sustained and thorough analysis of the ability of contemporary theories of justice to address the concerns of cognitively disabled persons. It is recommended for philosophers and those in disability studies.
— Marx and Philosophy Review of Books
In this original and timely book, Kacey Brooke Warren focuses on the political epistemological question of how we can determine what justice requires for citizens with such cognitive disabilities as Down syndrome, autism, and Alzheimer’s disease. She assesses existing philosophical proposals by two standards: one is the Standard of Presumptive Political Equality; the other is the Liberal Standard of Justification, which requires any justice regime be acceptable to those who fall within its scope. Warren argues that the proposals offered by Rawls, Nussbaum, and Kittay fail these standards. However, she finds promise in Axel Honneth’s concept of differentiated recognition, and her conclusion builds on this concept to develop an innovative method of political justification based on trust and transparency. Recognizing Justice for Citizens with Cognitive Disabilities is an important contribution to a fast-growing philosophical literature on justice for people with cognitive disabilities. In particular, it offers a groundbreaking sustained examination of a crucial aspect of the issue that has not received the philosophical attention it deserves.
— Alison M. Jaggar, University of Colorado, Boulder