Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Pages: 426
Trim: 6 x 9
978-1-4422-3686-8 • Paperback • July 2014 • $44.00 • (£35.00)
Steven D. Mercatante is the founder and editor-in-chief of the Globe at War, a website that has established the author as a respected authority on World War II. Mercatante received his JD from Michigan State University College of Law, graduating with a concentration in international law.
Part I
Chapter 1: The German War Machine on the Eve of War: Myth versus Reality
Chapter 2: The Third Reich Ascendant: The Reasons Why
Part II
Chapter 3: Comparing the World’s First Military Superpowers on the Eve of War
Chapter 4: History’s Bloodiest Conflict Begins
Chapter 5: An Inconvenient Decision Confronts Germany’s Masters of War
Chapter 6: Another Roll of the Dice
Chapter 7: Stalingrad in Context
Chapter 8: The European War’s Periphery
Chapter 9: Seizing the Initiative: The Sword versus the Shield
Part III
Chapter 10: A New Perspective for Explaining D-Day’s Outcome
Chapter 11: Hitler’s Greatest Defeat
Chapter 12: How the Third Reich Staved Off Total Defeat during the Summer of 1944
Chapter 13: End Game
Selected Bibliography
Steven Mercatante makes a new and compelling case regarding how Nazi Germany lost the war. Written with verve, this book is a page-turner for anyone interested in how the Second World War unfolded.
— The Historian
A thought-provoking book . . . [that] counter[s] widespread arguments that brute force was the main reason for success in World War II. . . . [Mercatante's] case deserves to be heard.
— World War II Magazine
Recommended all levels/libraries . . . challenges conventional wisdom about Allied success in Europe...an impressive operational overview. . . . Mercatante sees Operation Barbarossa as a turning point, nearly leading to Hitler's hegemony in Europe.
— Choice Reviews
Worth reading . . . much sound analysis . . . Mercatante . . . knows that the devil is in the details. To his credit, even those familiar with World War II scholarship will find here analyses of economic and technological matters that historians have often glossed over or mentioned only in passing.
— Michigan War Studies Review