Trust and Fear in Civil Wars

Ending Intrastate Conflicts

Shanna Kirschner

Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.

Lexington Books

Pages: 200 • Trim: 6 x 9

978-0-7391-9641-0 • Hardback • November 2014 • $97.00 • (£75.00)

978-0-7391-9643-4 • Paperback • March 2017 • $44.99 • (£35.00)

978-0-7391-9642-7 • eBook • November 2014 • $42.50 • (£33.00)

Subjects: Political Science / International Relations / General, Political Science / History & Theory, Political Science / International Relations / Treaties, Political Science / Peace, Political Science / Security (National & International)

Trust and Fear in Civil Wars

Ending Intrastate Conflicts

Hardback

Paperback

eBook

Summary

Why do some civil wars last a long time, while others end relatively quickly? Trust and Fear in Civil Wars examines the conditions under which individuals are willing to lay down their weapons under a settlement agreement. The author argues that wars are easiest to resolve when combatants believe that their adversaries will uphold a deal or that the costs of renewed war will be low. Several key sources of information inform this calculation. Drawing on both cross-national and case study data, including detailed interviews, the book demonstrates that when information suggests either that a peace agreement is likely to break down or that the results of a broken deal will be especially deadly, a settlement leaves combatants too vulnerable to countenance, resulting in wars lasting longer.

Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 200 • Trim: 6 x 9

978-0-7391-9641-0 • Hardback • November 2014 • $97.00 • (£75.00)

978-0-7391-9643-4 • Paperback • March 2017 • $44.99 • (£35.00)

978-0-7391-9642-7 • eBook • November 2014 • $42.50 • (£33.00)

Subjects: Political Science / International Relations / General, Political Science / History & Theory, Political Science / International Relations / Treaties, Political Science / Peace, Political Science / Security (National & International)

Author

Shanna Kirschner is assistant professor of political science at Allegheny College.

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction
Chapter Two: Trust and Fears for the Future
Chapter Three: Trust and Fear across Civil Wars
Chapter Four: Sri Lanka: Both Short And Long Civil Wars
Chapter Five: Turkey: Ongoing Conflict With No Settlement
Chapter Six: Cyprus: Frozen Conflict with No Settlement
Chapter Seven: Conclusions

Trust and Fear in Civil Wars

Ending Intrastate Conflicts

Shanna Kirschner

Trust and Fear in Civil Wars

Ending Intrastate Conflicts

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