The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959

Military Strategy or Political Stabilization

Dionysios Chourchoulis

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus.

The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank’s structure and function and relative value in NATO’s overall policy, and the alliance’s response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

Lexington Books

Pages: 290 • Trim: 6½ x 9⅜

978-0-7391-9305-1 • Hardback • December 2014 • $136.00 • (£105.00)

978-0-7391-9306-8 • eBook • December 2014 • $129.00 • (£99.00)

Subjects: History / Europe / Greece, History / Europe / Eastern, History / Military / General, History / Cold War

The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959

Military Strategy or Political Stabilization

Hardback

eBook

Summary

In 1951-52, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established the Southern Flank, a strategy for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in the Cold War involving Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Among its many aims, the Southern Flank sought to mobilize these countries as allies and integrate them into the Western defense system. Throughout the 1950s, the alliance developed the Southern Flank and in 1959 it was finally stabilized as fractious Greek-Turkish relations were improved by the temporary settlement over Cyprus.

The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959: Military Strategy or Political Stabilization examines, among other things, the initial negotiations of 1951-52, the Southern Flank’s structure and function and relative value in NATO’s overall policy, and the alliance’s response to the challenges in the eastern Mediterranean in the early Cold War. It explores not only the military aspects of the Southern Flank, but also the more controversial political aspects: the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, the short-lived military cooperation between these states and Yugoslavia during 1953-55 and the effects of the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations from 1955 due to Cyprus. It also focuses on the part played by other major members of the alliance, principally the United States and Britain, in Southern Flank politics and strategy. Thus, it considers how the United States and the U.K. viewed the power balance between the three Southern Flank members and how the Americans sought to influence affairs through financial, military and technical assistance, including the construction of U.S. bases in Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

The book also assesses the threat posed to the Southern Flank at various points by rising tensions in the Middle East. More generally, the book illuminates the complexities of intra-alliance dynamics in a region full of Cold War tensions. However, in its Middle Eastern/Eastern Mediterranean neighborhood, it was not only the Cold War that provided tensions, since the Arab-Israeli dispute and the tensions of decolonization further complicated the picture. Thus, the study of the Southern Flank is a test case of a Cold War theater which was subjected to additional historical pressures, creating a nexus of problems which the Western Alliance needed to address within its effort to respond to the various challenges of the Cold War.

Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 290 • Trim: 6½ x 9⅜

978-0-7391-9305-1 • Hardback • December 2014 • $136.00 • (£105.00)

978-0-7391-9306-8 • eBook • December 2014 • $129.00 • (£99.00)

Subjects: History / Europe / Greece, History / Europe / Eastern, History / Military / General, History / Cold War

Author

Dionysios Chourchoulis is instructor of European history at the Hellenic Open University.

Table of Contents

Introduction
1. The Road to NATO’s First Enlargement. From the Association of Greece and Turkey to NATO to their Full Admission (1950-February 1952)
2. The Establishment of NATO’s Southern Flank. Command Reorganization and Arrangements and Regional Defense (February 1952-March 1953)
3. The Ascendancy of the Southern Flank of NATO (1953-1954)
4. The Disintegration of the South-Eastern Rampart (Autumn 1954-August 1956)
5. Continuing Crisis and New Challenges (Autumn 1956-Autumn 1957)
6. From the Brink of Dissolution to Revival (Autumn 1957-December 1959)

Reviews

The Southern Flank of NATO takes a historical excursion off the beaten path, exploring the initial attempt to mount a political and military defense against the Soviet Union in Greece, Turkey, Italy, and at times, Yugoslavia. For this reason alone, this work is of value—this is an under-researched topic, and this study closes a gap in the historical literature. The work is packed with detail, and provides an excellent reference for anyone interested in Southern Europe or the early history of NATO.... This work closes a gap in the historical research with a comprehensive and extremely detailed look at NATO consolidation during the 1950s.... The reader can find some fascinating and challenging presentations of a very different world which tempts one to wrestle with an of a number of ‘could-have-beens.’
— The Strategy Bridge

Chourchoulis’s Southern Flank presents a rich, well-documented discussion of relationships among Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey and the eventual outcomes.
— Modern Greek Studies Yearbook

With thorough research and shrewd argument, Dionysios Chourchoulis uncovers the complex motives behind the making of NATO’s southern flank and sheds fresh light on the making of Cold War Europe.
— Joe Maiolo, Kings College London

No other region reveals more starkly the fault lines of the Atlantic alliance than its Southern Flank, the subject of Dionysios Chourchoulis’ richly researched, carefully argued, and meticulously documented study. The book focuses on the front’s formative decade, which saw the expansion of NATO’s responsibilities from Gibraltar to the Black Sea, and examines the principal crises which buffeted the West during the 1950s. It sheds important light on NATO’s internal dynamics, geopolitical fragmentation and intra-bloc rivalries. Chourchoulis’ assessment of NATO’s contributions to political stabilization in the Southern Flank, in contrast to its incoherent military strategy, is perceptive and challenges conventional interpretations. This is a significant and timely contribution to our understanding of the politics of the Atlantic alliance from its infancy to the present.
— John O. Iatrides, Southern Connecticut State University

The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959

Military Strategy or Political Stabilization

Dionysios Chourchoulis

The Southern Flank of NATO, 1951–1959

Military Strategy or Political Stabilization

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