Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

Audrey L. Anton

This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates several examples in which agents are not causally responsible for any morally relevant consequences, but they seem to be deserving of praise or blame nonetheless. Anton concludes that such cases are counterexamples to the primacy assumption, and turns her attention towards discerning what grounds desert of praise and blame if not retrospective moral responsibility.
Anton advances the moral attitude account, whereby agents deserve praise and blame in virtue of moral attitudes they have in response to moral reasons. These moral attitudes must be sufficiently sincere, which means they reach a threshold that distinguishes such attitudes as eligible for praise and blame. Anton adds that whether one deserves praise or blame and to what degree is sensitive to the agent’s personal moral progress as well as the status quo of her society. This addition brings with it the welcome consequence that morality may be objective, but we are still justified in judging one another charitably based on personal and societal limitations. « less more »

Lexington Books

Pages: 214 • Trim: 6 1/4 x 9 3/8

978-0-7391-9175-0 • Hardback • December 2015 • $93.00 • (£65.00)

978-0-7391-9176-7 • eBook • December 2015 • $88.00 • (£60.00)

Subjects: Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

Hardback

eBook

Summary

This book challenges a basic assumption held by many responsibility theorists: that agents must be morally responsible in the retrospective sense for anything in virtue of which they deserve praise or blame (the primacy assumption). Anton sets out to defeat this assumption by showing that accepting it as well as the much more intuitive causality assumption renders us incapable of making sense of cases whereby agents seem to deserve praise and blame. She argues that retrospective moral responsibility is a species of causal responsibility (the causality assumption). Then, she illustrates several examples in which agents are not causally responsible for any morally relevant consequences, but they seem to be deserving of praise or blame nonetheless. Anton concludes that such cases are counterexamples to the primacy assumption, and turns her attention towards discerning what grounds desert of praise and blame if not retrospective moral responsibility.
Anton advances the moral attitude account, whereby agents deserve praise and blame in virtue of moral attitudes they have in response to moral reasons. These moral attitudes must be sufficiently sincere, which means they reach a threshold that distinguishes such attitudes as eligible for praise and blame. Anton adds that whether one deserves praise or blame and to what degree is sensitive to the agent’s personal moral progress as well as the status quo of her society. This addition brings with it the welcome consequence that morality may be objective, but we are still justified in judging one another charitably based on personal and societal limitations.

Book Details

Lexington Books

Pages: 214 • Trim: 6 1/4 x 9 3/8

978-0-7391-9175-0 • Hardback • December 2015 • $93.00 • (£65.00)

978-0-7391-9176-7 • eBook • December 2015 • $88.00 • (£60.00)

Subjects: Philosophy / Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Author

Audrey Anton is assistant professor of philosophy at Western Kentucky University.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Sourcehood
Chapter 3: Sentiment Views
Chapter 4: Reasons-responsive Views
Chapter 5: Putting the Cart before the Horse
Chapter 6: Moral Attitudes
Chapter 7: Applications and Implications
Chapter 8: Conclusion

Reviews

This is, broadly speaking, Anton’s project. It’s an intriguing one, which should interest anyone preoccupied with philosophical questions concerning praise, blame, or, more generally, moral responsibility. It’s also timely. Theorists have increasingly approached questions of moral responsibility by first considering the nature and propriety of praise and blame. Those interested in such an approach should find plenty to engage with here.
— Journal of Moral Philosophy

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame is a well-written book that investigates complex issues in the metaphysics of moral responsibility. Among its contributions is an impressive discussion of sourcehood, sentiment, and reason-responsibility views of moral responsibility, including pluses and minuses of each view. Some traditional disputes are avoided but there is a solid understanding of the literature as well as provocative theses offered along the way. Is causal responsibility necessary for moral responsibility? Wait and see. This is a book worth reading and discussing.
— Joe Campbell, Washington State University

Anton provides a refreshing take on the topic of moral responsibility. By taking praise and blame as her central categories, she opens up new lines of inquiry in established debates.
— Linda Radzik, Professor of Philosophy, Texas A&M University

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

Audrey L. Anton

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame

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