Lexington Books
Pages: 192
Trim: 6½ x 9½
978-0-7391-3884-7 • Hardback • November 2010 • $120.00 • (£92.00)
978-0-7391-3885-4 • Paperback • November 2010 • $56.99 • (£44.00) - Currently out of stock. Copies will arrive soon.
978-0-7391-3886-1 • eBook • November 2010 • $54.00 • (£42.00)
Duncan Richter is professor of philosophy at Virginia Military Institute and author of The A to Z of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Why Be Good? A Historical Introduction to Ethics, Wittgenstein at His Word, and Ethics after Anscombe: Post 'Modern Moral Philosophy'.
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Chapter 1. War
Chapter 3 Chapter 2. Consequentialism
Chapter 4 Chapter 3. Obligation
Chapter 5 Chapter 4. Intention
Chapter 6 Chapter 5. Sex
Chapter 7 Chapter 6. Conclusion
A splendid book on a remarkable thinker, whose writings on ethics are deeply controversial. Richter makes clear the power and enduring interest of Anscombe's ideas. His reading is distinguished by sympathetic insight and sharp critical intelligence, making the book essential reading for anyone interested in ethics.
— Cora Diamond, University of Virginia
Richter provides a helpful guide to the moral philosophy of G.E.M. Anscombe, a leading 20th-century philosopher. His exposition of Anscombe's moral viewpoint develops through a thoughtful, accessible attempt to clarify and defend it against many leading critics. Throughout, Richter's development of Anscombe's views are sympathetic without being insensitive to Anscombe's often-shallow treatment of the history of philosophy. Accordingly, Richter succeeds in bringing out the manner in which Anscombe's though is important—not for its penetrating insight into the history of ideas, but for its novel contribution to that history. Chapters are generally organized around the development of concepts; e.g. chapter 1, "War," focuses primarily on the articulation and defense of the doctrine of double effect. Here Richter is less concerned with defending Anscombe's views on war's morality than with clarifying the doctrine and situating it in Anscombe's philosophy. Similarly, chapter 3, "Obligation," is concerned less with the concept and more with the manner in which a conception of the intelligibility of concepts informed Anscombe's views. Ultimately, this volume is not only an importnat supplement to the Anscombe literature, but also one that, in the process of clarifying the philosopher's views, makes an important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.
— Choice Reviews