Lexington Books
Pages: 216
•
Trim: 6¼ x 9
978-0-7391-1272-4 • Hardback • March 2006 • $117.00 • (£90.00)
978-0-7391-1273-1 • Paperback • March 2006 • $51.99 • (£40.00)
978-0-7391-6277-4 • eBook • March 2006 • $49.00 • (£38.00)
Jonathan B. Isacoff is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Gonzaga University.
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 The Historical Imagination of John Dewey
Chapter 3 Writing the Arab-Israeli Conflict
Chapter 4 History as Case Study: Qualitative Political Science Scholarship
Chapter 5 History as Data Point: The 1956 Arab-Israeli War and Quantitative IR
Chapter 6 Beyond the Middle East: Recent Debates on the Historiography of Vietnam
Chapter 7 Political Science's Historical Problem
Chapter 8 Solving the Historical Problem: History, Methodology, and Political Research
Chapter 9 Conclusion
In a work largely concerned with the treatment of history in political science, Isacoff argues that the resolution to the problem of hisotrical inquiry lives in John Dewey's pragmatism. Isacoff uses the orignal and critical historical accounts of the Arab-Israeli conflict to demonstrate this. He argues that political scientist should approach the historical record as necessarily problematic, with an eye toward solving contemporary political problems.
— Middle East Journal
Emphasizing the importance of history in political science literature, whether qualitative or quantitative, Isacoff raises critical questions about how political scientists utilize historical inquiry in their reserach methodologies.
— Choice Reviews
This is useful advice for all historians and political scientists, not only for analysts of contentious Middle Eastern issues.
— Journal of Palestine Studies
Historians seldom agree on the past at a level of detail useful to political scientists and narratives of the past accepted by historians are constantly changing. These realities pose enormous challenges to political scientists using historical episodes as accurate repositories of facts and as laboratories for testing theories. Isacoff's book is an important addition to a burgeoning discussion focused on the responsible uses of the work of historians by political scientists. Isacoff dramatically illustrates his argument by judicious examination of the implications of new bodies of historical work on standard codings of the 1956 Suez War and the Vietnam War by students of international politics. He breaks new ground by bringing John Dewey's pragmatism to bear on the methodological problems at issue and by scrutinizing the highly problematic relationship between data bases used by hundreds of international relations scholars and the changing interpretations of the past that constitute our dynamic historical record.
— Ian S. Lustick, University of Pennsylvania