Originalism and Its Critics
Originalism as an interpretive approach to the Constitution has recently experienced a resurgence in the political science and legal communities, and is widely recognized as one of the most important in constitutional jurisprudence. The approach has also received substantive criticism from a variety of different scholars. Drawing on historical, legal, as well as philosophical sources, originalism seeks to use the Founding, Framing, and debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution as a guide to constitutional jurisprudence. The approach has been broken into three distinct categories: original intent (what the original Framers of the Constitution intended when they wrote the document), original understanding (what the Framers as well as the broader public debates and contemporary commentary set forth), and original public meaning (what the text of the document in context meant to those who drafted it). This series seeks to explore different facets of originalism, including valuable and substantive critiques of the approach. The series is open to submissions on originalism focusing on theory, the Constitution, law, critiques of the approach, or any combination of these. The series is open to both political science and legal scholars. By advancing our understanding of originalism, scholars and those who practice the law can better understand the importance of originalism in constitutional jurisprudence today.

Editor(s): Guy Burnett (guyfburnett@gmail.com)
Staff editorial contact: Becca Rohde (brohde@rowman.com)
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